Understanding ten Hag's Philosophy – Build-up.
Understanding ten Hag's Philosophy – Build-up.
Reverse Engineering ten Hag's philosophy by watching his Manchester United team, in depth, this season – starting with their 2-1 loss to Brighton.
Erik ten Hag has swayed around answering questions around his methodology since he has been in England.
Under pressure from the likes of Carl Anka and Jamie Carragher, there have been some answers around wanting to meld both Manchester United’s traditional DNA, with his own attacking, exciting Ajax-adjacent ideals.
Anything more specific than that hasn’t necessarily been divulged, so in an attempt to reverse engineer what ten Hag’s philosophy is and attempts to be – I took a closer look at their loss to Brighton.
In Manchester United’s first phase, in their build-up look to do a few things intentionally.
The first is in their shape. Manchester United use Onana as a +1 one in the first line between two the CBs who split.
In front of this first line, Manchester United tend to deploy their double pivot, who at present typically consists of Casemiro and Kobbie Mainoo.
Their double pivot tends to be used in one of two ways – either as a narrow two (which plays slightly staggered) (forming a 4-2-2-2) or as a single DM with the second pivot player pushing up (forming a 4-1-2-3).
When their double pivot tends to become staggered looks like there is an intention to facilitate small-space interplay and to allow a player back to goal to pass it to a midfield partner facing forward.
When the pivot becomes double, they play narrow – in close proximity, and Brighton (like lots of opposition) committed bodies centrally, crowing that area of the field.
Naturally this opens up space in the wide areas of the pitch.
United seem to be reluctant to use the wide areas in the first line as an option.
FBs don’t often drop very low to receive the ball horizontally (a la Man City at times this season).
But at times against Brighton we saw Dalot receive the ball in line with Mainoo horizontally (see the image below) which is somewhat low for a fullback in the build-up all things considered.
This increases the distance Brighton’s FBs or CM have to jump to press Dalot, as Minteh has pressed Lisandro from out-to-in in this situation.
Lisandro then finding Dalot becomes a good solution, and Dalot can receive the ball in space.
In general – United focus on situational movements, in almost a relational fashion, in the build-up, as well as the individual brilliance of their central defenders to manipulate to ball against the pressure of opposition to then find fullbacks wide, or attackers higher up the pitch.
Whether Dalot stays wide or moves narrow, whether Dalot moves up the pitch or moves deep to receive the ball feels more based on intuition and reading the picture of the game than an instruction from ten Hag. This is a guess, not fact.
Putting onus on the central defenders and keeper to deal with the (often man to man pressure) leaves additional bodies higher up the field, which in theory allows them to attack quicker, with more bodies, and support against an underloaded opposition defence.
Cutting movements from out to in, from Mazraoui or Dalot aim to get the ball to the fullbacks in inverted/inside channels.
I believe these cutting, in-field movements help explain why ten Hag may play fullbacks on the opposite side to their natural foot. A two-footed FB in these situation would be ideal of course.
A right footed left back receives more naturally infield, with his right. The opposite is true too.
Wrong footed FBs also have the benefit of finding passing in-field, when building up back to goal. Angle-wise, it’s easier for a right footed left back to pass it to his central midfielder facing his own goal.
The third midfielders role in the build-up (Bruno on the left side, Mount on the right side) is focused on pinning potential markers, opening up passing lanes, or receiving the ball directly to spring vertical attacks.
Both Bruno and Mount may drop into an attacking midfield position to receive an initial direct pass, but it is unlikely to see them drop into central or defensive midfield positions.
The near side #8 (Bruno or Mount) drop in, the other plays as a #9.
The rationale here feels like to facilitate up-back-through schemes in which they pass the ball back to players who, facing the play, can play United’s attackers through – first time.
Casemiro is a player with a natural tendency to play direct passes and often.
He usually has a decent ability to execute on these too but United fans have criticised the frequency at which he plays these vertical passes.
I think ten Hag has asked him to play those passes instructionally.
A player like Eriksen in this situation, probably suits United better, for his quality in executing those long passes but as we’ll find out in subsequent pieces, the role of the central midfield two in ten Hag’s system requires lots of leg work.
It’s hard to find a player that sort of marries both of those qualities – big space coverage and accurate deep passing.
A fully fit Reece James sort of fits that mould.
The above image shows a very narrow double pivot, with Casemiro’s central movement opening up a passing lane for Mount who drops into a third midfield position, receiving a direct pass from Onana.
Mount receives the ball and Casemiro de-marks himself from Welbeck.
Casemiro's movement crowds that passing lane slightly but prior to doing so this he turns his head, noticing Mount is a viable option to get the ball.
In my opinion, Casemiro anticipates Mount will receive the ball after opening that passing lane for him, and spins in behind to receive a first time pass from Mount.
If this were to happen Casemiro has the ball facing forward (through an up-back-through scheme).
Casemiro would then look to release the quick wingers of Manchester United. Instead Mount with his right foot sweeps it out to the fullback.
A left footed, right half-space player here makes sense angle-wise – perhaps Amad? Perhaps Hojlund dropping deep?
Either way, the above example may help explain ten Hag's preference for focusing their build-up through the middle to manufacture those vertical situations in which the aim is to find your fast attackers in behind.
In the absence of strong, correct footed fullbacks, the up-back-through makes most sense from the perspective of footedness and angles – by playing through the middle.
When Shaw is back, the ‘up’ part of this scheme can be done with a left footed FB, the back can be done by the right footed left winger, and the through can be done by the left central midfield. In those situations you can look to find your 9 running in behind.
I don’t know if ten Hag has moved away from that due to lack of personnel, or due to a preference for attacking centrally – perhaps to ensure bodies remain in the middle for rest defence.
It’s something to think about but those are some potential answers.
Another example can be seen below.
Dalot’s inside movement pins Minteh, and Mainoo intelligently moves out wide to maintain positional balance.
Casemiro drops deep, staying narrow alongside Dalot, and drawing Gilmour out.
This opens the passing lane for Maguire to find Mount (third midfielder).
Casemiro turns to face the play and receives a first time pass from Mount.
Casemiro immediately looks for Rashford in behind and plays an (overhit) pass – attempting to find him.
Rashford in this situation is on the last line, anticipating this scheme but ten Hag’s plan is on full display here. It doesn’t come off but you can see what United are trying to do.
Erik ten Hag’s commitment to verticality and directness isn’t just seen in the on-floor build-up or central up-back-through schemes.
Onana’s pass selection is deliberately direct and vertical, often.
As Dalot situationally moves infield, behind the narrow pressure of Minteh inverting, he’s a viable option to receive the ball.
I think this is good movement from him.
What this does do is entice the circled player in red (I assume Veltman, but I can’t be sure) to step up and try to close the gap.
Instead, Onana having baited the opposition to step up realises that Rashford is 1v1 and plays it (with too much power) to Rashford, and United turn it over.
The player (I assume is Veltman) does well to cancel his pressure on Dalot when he realises Onana is ready to lauch the ball and forms a 2 vs 1 around Rashford.
Although Rashford gets the header, there are no players around him in this situation regardless – which is a problem we’ll discuss in a future piece.
Strictly focusing on the build-up tendencies of Manchester United, this does suggest some pre-formed ideas in Onana’s mind about finding the last line, directly when opposition players push up and leave them 1 vs 1.
Summary of ten Hag’s (build-up) principles:
• 2 CBs & GK in first line.
• Wide FBs making up a back 4 in build-up.
• Pivot fluctuates between single and double, but is primarily deployed in something that looks like 4-1-2-3.
• Third midfielder acts to pin opposition midfielders, act as a third man support for the midfield or the flank (winger, fullback & third midfielder)
• Fullbacks and pivot given the licence to rotate to create situational solutions to opposition press (Mainoo’s small space quality, positional versatility, and rotational intelligence in particular makes sense here as does Mazraoui, Lisandro and Dalot’s).
• Solutions to the above aren’t choreographed but include:
pivot player dropping short with FB staying wide.
FB cutting in-field to receive behind opposition winger moving.
double pivot / pivot + FB narrow centrally, to leave open inside channel for GK or CB to find third midfielder directly.
• Focus on verticality in their build-up, as seen in Onana’s launches in particular – (poor backing up / getting around for the second ball).
• Onana’s long balls into the wide-man potentially triggered by opposition (fullback?) stepping up and leaving Rashford 1v1.
• Focus on up-back-through as solutions, with end-goal to find runners in behind, early as seen in Casemiro’s first time passes when facing goal, and in Eriksen/Bruno’s use (by ten Hag) deeper in previous seasons.
• With wrong footed FBs coming in-field and less able to play vertical passes up field, the up-back-through schemes are focused on being facilitated through 8s back to 6s to wingers/CFs running in behind. FBs wide-positioning therefore makes sense in this regard.
There are questions around whether these are the principles most conducive to success.
It relies on technical brilliance from the central defenders – see Lisandro and Yoro.
Two footed defenders make sense if you’re focusing on the ability to manipulate angles and find the second line based on individual technical quality and courage — someone like Huijsen comes to mind.
At Ajax, ten Hag used both Timber and Lisandro in these central defensive roles. Tiny players all things considered but great footballers and the expectation and priority for them to play and solve individually makes sense looking at that selection.
It requires aerial or hold-up quality from the wide players. as well as an ability to run in behind. Rashford struggles with the hold-up and aerially part of winning his duels despite his height, at present.
Links to Sterling make sense to me for a number of reasons — his hold up play fits into the above mould, he’s a threat in behind and he crashes the back post to score, which suits how United attack in the final third, playing on minimum width principles.
It requires long passing quality and big space coverage from the pivot and there’s improvements on Casemiro in this regard. Examples of players of a profile that might suit this role? Someone like a younger De Bruyne or a Reece James.
Most of all it requires a hell of a lot from the fullbacks having to play two-way, whilst reading the game and moving into zones that exploit opposition shape – I have a new appreciation for Dalot and Mazraoui following this piece.
Daley Blind, an incredibly intelligent footballer, did it for ten Hag’s Ajax — that doesn’t surprise me at all. Zinchenko has his 1 vs 1 frailties but is a player that would do this role well. Calafiori, with an ability to play inside, or hold width makes sense too. I know I’m just naming Arsenal players here but they’re front of the mind, easy to go to examples to illustrate a point
In theory, I think it could possibly work as a set-up. It’s an interesting one.
I think it’s very unique and difficult to implement entirely.
It requires more specific profiles of players that are less readily available than other build-up systems and game-models top teams use.
But, if you profile players appropriately, perhaps you get something that looks like United now — only with a greater % of success per action.
Understanding ten Hag’s United is more than just calling it generic tactical buzzwords.
If United fans are to believe there is a vision or a plan worth getting behind, it is probably worth delving into some of the supposed intentions of the coach and trying to explain why the decisions he is making, are the ones he is making.
Hopefully, this exploration into Manchester United’s build-up contributes to that in some way.
brilliant piece Umir, and well observed w.r.t the fullback space manipulation
would add:
Onana is often poor on these long range pass attempts
Casemiro gets more of the progressive long ball chances than Mainoo in this system
Amad doesn't get the aerial/through ball nearly as much as Rashford, he's encouraged to commit take ons 1v1 or 1v2