An Insomniac’s guide to the UCL final (Inter Milan Opposition Analysis)
An Insomniac’s guide to the UCL final (Inter Milan Opposition Analysis)
The Attacking Phase Explored: Potential solutions Manchester City could use to better Inter Milan [10/06/2023]
This is an archived article first published on the night before the UCL Champions League final in which Manchester City eventually won. In beginning to use my Substack more frequently, I am bringing over archived posts from another publishing platform so this space can act as a central hub for most of my works. It’s fun to read this knowing how the game eventually panned out. I think it aged fairly well. I also predicted the method in which City did score via Rodri, ha. See if you can spot it.
[10/06/2023] — I have a bad relationship with sleep and Manchester City play Inter Milan in the Champions League final tonight.
I’m up at unusual hours more often than not, only today Manchester City face Inter Milan in the Champions League final. I can hear the post-sunrise birds chirping away as I finish this piece that could never cover all of the intricacies of the upcoming match in depth sufficient enough for me to be content with, so instead I focused only on Manchester City’s potential solutions against Inter Milan in the attacking phase.
General —
Inter Milan do play with proactivity and step up within their 532 block.
When the ball does get played backwards by the attacking side, particularly under moments of pressure, it works to bait and draw Inter’s players (primarily their midfielders) out before the opportunity to play through and around them may arise. You get a sense of urgency and aggression from the Inter midfield at times. Paired with provocation and resetting possessions in a De Zerbian way, I wonder how effectively attacking sides could manipulate Inter’s defensive shape. Specific to City, I do think a small-space specialist like Foden and ball-retention monsters like Grealish and Bernardo would be of value as Inter try and press intensely with their midfield and defence.
Side note: I feel defenders would be less willing to leave their zones in a final as readily as they might otherwise do.
Onana, weak zones, buildup —
Onana seems to be weakest saving shots that go are high and to his right. This is particularly true if Onana has shifted his weight towards his left initially. Looking to fabricate situations where this may occur could be worthwhile.
Onana has a habit of punching crosses out potentially forcing loose balls in dangerous areas.
Particularly from lower crosses, near post movement seems to prove valuable against Onana too.
In an interview, Onana talks about the need for modern keepers who now have to ‘play where there is space’ — differing from the keepers of old being taught to avoid playing central. It’s a nice reflection. It also does highlight willingness and bravery in Onana’s game. What it does allude to is a potentiality to invite Onana to play into pressing traps. Onana is incredibly brave. Onana will take risks. Give him small percentage bait.
Forcing Inter down their left seems to be a viable option — Onana is great with both feet but less great with his left foot. Off of the eye test, I feel like Inter have been caught out more when they’re trapped towards the left and have to try to play out. This is a feeling more than anything, but a concrete example would be the tendency of Onana to play the long ball off his left against Juventus following an out to in press coming from Onana’s right. Short build-up was seen less in that situation.
Lukaku and Dumfries’ aerial, hold-up and outlet threat is right-sided before it is left sided. Perhaps that explains that side’s weakness in part. If the left footed DiMarco is playing back to goal whilst pressed, his left footedness causes awkwardness when playing it back to his centre-backs. It feels as if I’ve seen build up mistakes on that side more from centre-backs too, than on the right.
This is an insomniac’s guide to the final however and I cannot corroborate that in any more detail than this. The rest of the piece is detailed as it is. This might be breaking the fourth wall.
The in-swinging cross (particularly from the right) matters —
This is a method of chance creation Manchester City will have to look to — to maximise their chances against Inter Milan. This is for a multitude of reasons. The first being Onana’s tendency to play front-footed and claim crosses.
The in-swinging cross, particularly in a more looping trajectory is a question that requires Onana answering. In previous sporadic events, Onana has misjudged the flight of an in-swinging cross as he moves to aggressively claim the ball. To make use of exploiting Onana’s game here, you would be aiming for the back post, with a genuinely deep cross.
Onana aside, the deep in-swinging cross remains a great method of output particularly against five-back teams.
The subheading here mentions particularly from the right. That is mainly given Bernardo Silva’s profile and quality in fashioning the space to play the cross and playing the cross itself as seen in abundance through the 18/19 season. Bernardo’s in-swinging crosses most importantly introduces Ilkay Gundogan, with perfect timing and good aerial threat, to attack the box too (alongside an Erling Haaland and less often, but hopefully Jack Grealish).
De Bruyne, Walker or Stones can readily act as an underlapping decoy run to help Bernardo fashion a yard to play the cross with more ease when compared to his teammates on the left flank.
Set pieces and corners taken quickly —
Inter play two of their players, one of them being Dzeko or Lukaku at the front of the six yard box, zonally. They leave one, possibly two on the edge of the box (one preempting the short corner and the other positioned to stop rebounds/long shots/edge of the area actions, after the first action) and the rest of the players form a cohort around the penalty spot.
Regarding corners, a pattern that has found some success against Inter is to play a deeper cross looking for an isolated player who then heads it back towards goal. With at least one of Inter’s big aerial threats often positioned within the six yard area and with Onana a strong and proactive claimer of the ball aerially, moving the ‘others’ towards the goal whilst aiming for a player towards the back of the pack seems to root Onana to the spot and allow teams to create a favourable goal-scoring opportunities or second/loose ball situation — see Fiorentina’s goal against Inter, see Bayern’s goal vs Inter.
Within this too, given Onana’s (and probably many keepers’) weakness with dealing with shots placed high, the headers into the ground which then bounce up seem to have found success against Onana and Inter Milan.
There has also been some success or potential for success in quick set-pieces.
Onana’s proactive positioning from this free-kick tempts Napoli into shooting from goal under the guise of a deep cross to the packed box. This is completely viable.
The shot ends up going wide but with the ball-striking quality of a Kevin De Bruyne, this should be a possibility to consider in such a fine-margin sport.
Napoli (like the great Alexander-Arnold before them) demonstrate the value of quick corners against Inter Milan. Throughout that game, there was genuine and focused attention and ingenuity in the set-pieces that on another day would’ve rewarded them with multiple goals.
As we can see below, the proactive positioning of Onana is again evident but here it is more likely that the intention is to organise his box. We don’t see the two Inter Milan players in the six yard box as they usually are. The rest of the side is in the process of organising.
The quick corner finds the Napoli player able to take a shot off at the near post and Onana springs to get back and make the save but again, a genuine chance.
There is a need to push Inter’s back line back and exploit the space that presents in front of it, rather than just looking to get in behind —
There are various ways to achieve this but two primary methods both involve the threat of penetrative verticality. The first option would be to have a dribbler attacking the space and running towards the back line. The second would be to have the last line attackers move to run in behind, ideally collectively.
The central Napoli player (by the penalty spot) makes a darting run in behind as the ball handler fakes to play him in, before looking and deliberately finding the player in space vacated by his teammate’s movements and the gravity of the box.
Napoli score against Inter Milan with their goal highlighting both of the aforementioned ways to push a defence back before punishing them in the space they leave.
The directness of Elmas’ initial run pushes the Inter Milan defence back and with intelligence and poise, the Napoli attacker turns to play the pass into the opened-up space on the edge of the box. It’s sensible and ball-retentive.
Zielinksi then positions his body as to play a deeper, in-swinging cross (a valuable method in itself) but instead very astutely finds Anguissa on the edge of the area. This focused seeking for the player who has pulled away from the low block’s deep set defence is incredibly valuable against stubborn shapes.
It’s something I’ve spoken about for a while now.
Arsenal have shown a beautiful proficiency for it this season with players like Xhaka consistently looking for passes towards (the main player being) Odegaard, as the defending line is drawn to the gravity of the six yard box (zone gravity) or the gravity of attackers (note, certain attackers draw greater personal gravity and Haaland is one of the best in the world for it).
This is an example of a move Fiorentina conclude against Inter Milan. After a great passage of play, the winger’s shot is blocked. With the threat of the winger’s movement towards their goal and the numerous attackers in the box lurking in dangerous positions, both teams are being drawn towards the goal. This would’ve been an apt situation in which to have a player lurking on the edge or just within the box to receive a pass and play a first time shot.
The half-spaces —
Inter’s back five tends to play extremely narrow, almost looking like 5 centre halves at times.
Shifting the ball horizontally forces the midfield three to have to cover greater distance which opens up the potential for passes through them and into the half-space.
How this may be best exploited is by the later arriving threat of a wide right player to draw the wide midfielder wide enough to play the pass into the half-space player.
For Manchester City this could be done in various ways but a potential solution could be to have the RB (eg. John Stones) make that later arrival as the now, wide right player.
The winger, in the most likely case, Bernardo Silva will have, in this situation, drifted into the half-space asking questions of the opposition left back — to jump or not to jump. Either way, with that option open, Bernardo is able to receive, turn and shoot or play a reverse pass to the now overlapping RB.
If not being done by the FB making that arrival wide with the winger moving inside, the winger (Bernardo) could be the wide player for the move, they’d have to start from a deeper position or drag the outside central midfielder towards them by other means. The #8 would then receive it in the half-space. I do think there are a few players better than De Bruyne in the small spaces though, but if he’s able to get a shot away, he’s one of the best for it.
Personally, the right half-space and the small spaces it exists in, suit Foden’s skillset most. I doubt he starts given City’s solidified and consistent starting XI but as he’s shown prior through the long shot goal against Dortmund, his assist against Atletico’s horrid (compliment) low block, and his assist against Real Madrid, he is a master of receiving, turning, and playing in that space. His unpredictability in his early, often near-post, long shot or excellent final pass from the right half-space is the sort of individually brilliant quality that is difficult to prepare for, that can be the difference in a fine margin match.
More broadly and in addition to this, it is certainly possible to play vertical and punch passes through the gaps that appear between Inter’s midfield three which express tendencies to leave spaces, I assume, expecting the front two to block passing lanes into. These become more obvious as the game goes on and players tire. This is not inventing the wheel by any stretch of the imagination but it is true nonetheless. For that reason, patience is paramount and a probing game of fewer chances is a pattern that may be to be expected. Not to worry, pass, pass, pass, wait for the right moment and when it does appear (possibly with Foden on the pitch at that point) act. These spaces I’m talking about are far less likely to be present earlier on if Inter do settle into one of their solid shapes.
Given Inter’s narrow back five and the large amount of space the midfield three have to cover laterally especially if the back five are pinned across the entire line (and with the additional gravity of Haaland) — the half spaces become areas in which players can receive the ball often. From here shots should be encouraged. If deeper, crosses to the back post are viable methods of scoring too.
Gundogan and De Bruyne should see the ball in these zones relatively frequently.
If we take a look at the Napoli fixture, we can see a unique doubling up of the Inter Milan players on Kvaratskhelia. The stylistic and functional similarities between Grealish and Kvaratskhelia aren’t lost on me and I wonder whether Inter deploy similar methods against Grealish (or Bernardo). In a way it is important Grealish makes his influence and aura known early on in the game to draw the extra man onto him. Inter are willing to commit two to one qualitatively superior player but with City having many quality players, space freeing up centrally or in midfield can be used to good effect.
Lastly in mentioning the value of the half space, it is important to mention the chance creation method of the underlapping run once the winger faces up his man.
This is such a commonality in Manchester City’s game with whatever right winger plays and Kevin De Bruyne, making that underlapping run to receive the pass into space before playing a cross. This is entirely viable particularly with the narrow Inter defence and difficulty in the Inter midfield three being able to shift across immediately.
By building down one side (in City’s case, the left), tilting the field towards that side before playing quickly to move it to the opposite side — as Inter look to shift across, the space is present for the inside right player to make a movement in behind.
Inter’s narrow LWB comes across but their narrowness could give rise to additional time for the right winger to play his pass. The gravity of the 9 may further occupy the LCB as does the aforementioned horizontal field tilt. The Inter Milan left central midfield is looking to cover the vertical pass and so the attacking side’s right 8 can make that run relatively unopposed.
There is a tendency for Inter’s centre-backs to follow 9s —
There is a tendency for Inter’s centre-backs to follow 9s out of possession at times. De Bruyne running in behind the space Haaland can vacate by dropping deep a la the Arsenal game becomes a possibility. Haaland’s left footedness makes him a better option floating towards the right side of the pitch, as back to goal his passes played inwards make more sense in execution and angles.
Ultimately though, Inter Milan’s defenders want to play deep and in a line together. By having attackers draw defenders out and not immediately returning to the last line instils an unease and on occasion Inter’s defenders have slotted back into their line of defence leaving attackers free to pick up the ball and turn in dangerous areas.
If Dumfries is involved in the buildup —
If Dumfries is involved in the buildup he plays at awkward angles and isn’t proficient back to goal so preventing him passing it back to the centre back and preventing him from playing facing the opposition goal amplifies an existing weakness. It is more likely than not that Dumfries will be pushed higher up the field and excused of build-up responsibilities in this way.
Throw-ins —
Off of throw-in situations, and this is more of a generic suggestion, Inter like many teams overload the near-side. Given their narrow midfield coverage however, facilitating a fast switch from throw-in situations, moving the ball to the far side works to prey on numerical inferiorities. It allows the attacking side to get their strong players at the least one against one, and in that situation you would hope their qualitative superiority (as Manchester City players) would shine through.
The Overloaded Side:
Lastly, with Inter Milan willing to play three players towards the flank with a fourth in the form of the central CB or the 6 shifting over, there is increased value in the defenders being able to support and contribute to attack, especially in the smaller spaces.
Walker is naturally able to play and become the sixth man, pushing high and wide on the right — this would outnumber the Inter back five but I believe Stones makes the most sense at right back. By playing Stones at right back, City are able play four, or even five players towards one flank (eg. Haaland, KDB, Stones, Bernardo, Rodri/Akanji). Stones is more proficient technically and has the ability to rotate and play well in numerous zones, whether that be deeper, centrally, or wide.
Both wide CBs are able to push up either side of Rodri and form what may look like a 1-3-6, without vastly overcommitting (even though it may read like that on paper). This is also predicated on the idea Inter Milan will be less reluctant to press and more focused on blocking space and based on the assumption switches may be difficult to manufacture as per the Brighton and Everton games. If Inter are willing to step up and press (the expectation of a final might factor into this) then resetting deeper (in that De Zerbian way mentioned at the start of the piece), can open up spaces on the opposite side of the midfield three.
Fin:
That concludes the hours of watching and extracting various theory regarding Manchester City in the attacking phase against Inter Milan’s 532.
The beauty of the sport is that even with all of those considerations explored, football is a game of infinity and some, all or none of the above may or may not come to fruition.
For at least 90 minutes, 22 people in and of themselves decide the outcome of the biggest game of the club season on their execution.
It’s cool and scary.
Good morning/night.